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LEAVING MONEY ON THE TABLE: DO
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS FAIL TO FILE

CLAIMS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS?
JAMES D. COX*
RANDALL S. THOMAS"
Commencing two decades ago, and continuing today, the institutional
investor is the most significant focus in reform efforts for securities markets
and the American corporation. Whether the question is the type of
disclosures that must be made in connection with a public offering,' the
scope of nonpublic offerings, 2 or making the corporation more responsive to
owners, 3 the focus is on the significant trading and ownership interest of
institutional investors. As is well understood, such emphasis on financial
institutions in reforming corporate and securities laws is based upon their
ownership of, and trading in, the stock of publicly held corporations. For
example, financial institutions own nearly 50% of the equity securities listed
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and account for approximately
75% of the daily trading volume on the NYSE.4 The ownership and trading
* Brainerd Currie Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
** Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School.
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1. The SEC's integrated disclosure procedures and shelf registration process is heavily
dependent upon the view that the securities of companies eligible to use the integrated disclosure
system are traded in an efficient market. See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act
Release No. 33-6383 (Mar. 3, 1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 11,819 (Mar. 19, 1982); Randall S. Thomas &
James F. Cotter, Measuring Securities Market Efficiency in the Regulatory Setting, 63 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 109 (Summer 2000). That determination in part rests upon a belief that
institutional investors are both significant traders and owners of such securities.
2. Though Rule 144A is technically a resale exemption, not an issuer exemption, it was
developed to facilitate capital raising by issuers by permitting securities to be effectively syndicated to
financial institutions, qualified institutional buyers, who are generally defined as an entity having a
securities portfolio of at least $100 million. Institutional investors also are swept within the definition
of an accredited investor to whom the issuer has no obligation to provide investment information as a
condition of selling its securities. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (2001) (Securities Act Rule 502(a)); 17
C.F.R. § 230.506 (2001) (Securities Act Rule 506).
3. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor
Voice, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 811 (1992); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The
Institutional Investor as CorporateMonitor, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1277 (1991). Cf., Edward B. Rock,
The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445
(1991).
4. At the close of the third quarter of 2001 financial institutions held 50.8% of all publicly
traded equities. See NYSE Fact Book 2000, at 61 (citing Federal Reserve Board "Flow of Funds,"
available at www.federalreserve.gov). The best indication of the overall volume of institutional
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percentages are equally high for securities listed on the North American
Securities Dealers Exchange (Nasdaq).5
Though we also champion the vast potential that has been accorded
institutional investors, we examine here one area where financial institutions
are claimed to be guilty of passivity equal to that of the "small investors": do
financial institutions fail to submit claims for their losses in settled securities
class actions? In other words, do institutions frequently leave money on the
table that is theirs for the asking?
I. THE UNEVEN ROLE OF THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR IN PROSECUTING
SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS

In their now classic article, Professors Elliott Weiss and John Beckerman
marshalled data collected from eighty-two class action settlements to reveal
that the fifty largest claimants in these class actions had an average allowed
loss of $597,000 and accounted for 57.5% of the total allowed loss. 6 More
significantly, the largest and the second-largest claimants accounted for
13.1% and 6.7%, respectively, of the total recognized losses of a subset of
twenty class actions within their overall sample.7 From this finding, Weiss
and Beckerman argued that judges considering settlements in securities class
actions should harness the economic self-interest of such a larger claimant(s)
by designating those with significant losses as the suit's lead plaintiffs.8
Doing so would address the broadly recognized concern that class actions are
"lawyer driven," and that it is the economic interests of the classes' attorneys,
not the classes' representatives, that decide such important issues as whether
the claim should be prosecuted, settled, or pursued to the next level. 9 Though
trading is the data regarding "block" trades, i.e., trades of a least 10,000 shares for an individual stock.
For 2001, block trades represented 48.1% of total trading volume on the NYSE, a decline however
from a high of 57% in 1995. Id. at 99. More generally, see Jerome Markam, Protecting the
InstitutionalInvestor-JunglePredatoror Shorn Lamb, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 345, 347-48 (1995).
5. The data set forth supra note 4 regarding institutional holdings of traded equities does not
distinguish between NYSE- and Nasdaq-listed securities. However, Nasdaq reports that at the end of
2000 some 40.3% of the Nasdaq National Market Securities was held by institutions (whereas
institutions owned 37.8% of all Nasdaq-traded securities, which rises to 47.4% when measured by
value). http://www.marketdata.nasdaq.com/asp/Sec4TSO.asp. Block trades represent 25% of the
trading volume in Nasdaq National Market Securities. See http://www.marketdata.nasdaq.com/asp/
Sec4Blockvol.asp.
6. Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional
Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2089 (1995).

7. Id. at 2090.
8. Id. at 2105-09.
9. The literature on this point is vast. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private
Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV.
215 (1983); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understandingthe Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic
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Weiss and Beckerman reasoned that courts had the inherent power to take
such steps, Congress decided not to leave such matters to the individual
judgment of the presiding judge. Thus, with the enactment of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), t0 formal procedures for
the appointment of a lead plaintiff were mandated for securities fraud class
actions.
Section 21D(a)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act" sets forth the
procedures and criteria for the appointment of lead plaintiffs. Within twenty
days of the filing of the complaint, notice must be published "in a widely
circulated national business-oriented publication or wire service" inviting
class members to apply to be the suit's representative.' 2 Not later than ninety
days after the publication of such notice, the court must appoint a lead
plaintiff from those who have applied.' 3 The most significant factor
supporting a presumption of who is the "most adequate plaintiff' is the
claimant that "has the largest financial interest" in the suit. 14 The next
provision underscores the strength of this presumption by providing that it
can only be overcome by proof that the party having the largest financial
interest will not adequately represent the class or is subject to unique
defenses.15
Thus far, the debate surrounding the selection of a lead plaintiff has
focused on the propriety of aggregating investor losses so as to enjoy the
benefits of the before-described presumption.' 6 This, of course, is not just a
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
669 (1986); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV.
533 (1997); John Macey & Geoffrey Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Actions and
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1
(1991); Randall S.Thomas & Robert G. Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and DerivativeLawsuits: A
CriticalAnalysis,87 Nw. U. L. REv. 423 (1993).
10. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-47, 109 Stat. 937 (1995).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(2001).
12. Section 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i). Additional notice can be required by the presiding court. Id. at
§ 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(ii).
13. Section 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i).
14. Section 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I). The other two factors listed are that the designee was the party
to the original complaint or petitioned to be the lead plaintiff and "otherwise satisfies the requirements
of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. Since any plaintiff must meet the latter
requirement, and the court is unlikely to be disposed to seek out a representative who is not before it,
the relative size of the claimant naturally becomes the determining factor of whether the presumption
applies.
15. Section 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(Il).
16. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions, and Other Developments in the Selection of
Lead Counsel under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 65-78 (Spring/Summer 2001)
(arguing tht aggregation weakens the relationship between lead plaintiff and class counsel); R. Chris
Heck, Comment, Conflict and Aggregation: Appointing InstitutionalInvestors as Sole Lead Plaintiffs
under the PSLRA, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1220-21 (1999) (suggesting that courts must restrain
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tussle among competing class members but has serious ramifications for the
plaintiffs' securities bar. Under the PSLRA, the lead plaintiff, subject to the
approval of the court, has the power to select and retain counsel.' 7 Any doubt
about a class counsel's stakes regarding who is the lead plaintiff was resolved
by In re Microstrategy, Inc. Sec. Litig.,' 8 where initially Mr. Mazza was
appointed lead plaintiff because he had the greatest loss among the five
applicants. 9 Mr. Mazza's selection of Firm A as class counsel was
approved.20 Later, he withdrew as lead plaintiff for personal reasons. 2'
Thereafter, following motions to be appointed as lead plaintiff to replace Mr.
Mazza, the Minami family and Local 144 Nursing Home Pension Fund were
appointed co-lead plaintiffs. 22 The Minami family's losses of $900,000 were
the greatest among the other petitioners, and Local 144's losses of $600,000
were deemed to qualify it as co-lead plaintiff.23 They each had their own
choice of counsel: Firm B for the Minami family and Finn C for Local 144.24
Both requests were approved by the court, with the effect that the Firm A
ceased to be engaged in the suit 25 and could only watch from the sidelines as
the parties entered into a subsequent settlement that ultimately resulted in the
new class counsel being awarded $27.6 million.26 Thus, who is the lead
plaintiff matters, and matters a lot, to the attorneys who seek to represent the
class.
Because class counsel appointments depend upon who is selected as the
lead plaintiff,27 the lead plaintiff provision effectively stimulates a
tournament among competing attorneys to identify themselves with investors
whose losses are so significant that they may qualify as the most adequate
plaintiff. As such, the lead plaintiff provision has not eliminated the strong
aggregation to avoid lawyers assembling groups in ways that restore control over the litigation to
themselves).
17. Section 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(V).
18. Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,632 (E.D. Va. 2001).
19. Id. at 97,736 n.10.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 97,740 n.37.
27. And, with the decision in In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001), the
lead plaintiff is all the more important in identifying who will be class council. Cendant held that in
most instances where the court has appointed a lead plaintiff, it would be inappropriate for the trial
court to select counsel through a competitive bidding process. Prior to Cendant, many courts severed
the process of appointing lead plaintiff from the selection of counsel and discharged the latter
responsibility by inviting interested firms to engage in competitive bidding. See generally Fisch, supra
note 16, at 78-95.
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interest of class counsel in the initiation of securities class actions; they
remain lawyer-driven notwithstanding the PSLRA.28
Table 1 presents the results of our search of the Westlaw ALLFED library
database for opinions bearing on courts' appointments of lead plaintiffs.
Between January 1, 1996, and December 15, 2001, we found thirty-six
reported opinions dealing with the presiding court's selection of a lead
plaintiff.
Table I
SUMMARY OF FIVE-YEAR HISTORY OF SELECTING LEAD PLAINTIFF

11
Cases without an Institutional Petitioner
12
Petitioners
Cases with Competing Institutional
8
Selected
Petitioner
Institutional
and
Petitioner
Institutional
Cases with Single
5
Individual/Group Selected Over Institution
The above data seems to show that when there is a contest between a
financial institution and an individual, or group of individuals, vying to be
the lead plaintiff, the institution generally is determined to be the most
adequate plaintiff. In twenty out of twenty-five cases where institutions
applied to be lead plaintiffs, they were selected. However, our curiosity is
piqued by the absence of a petitioning institutional investor in one-third of
our sample. We also wonder what happened in the five instances in which
the court selected a group of individuals over the petitioning institution.
Our intuition is that, on average, institutional investors are more likely to
trade significantly larger blocks of shares than individuals over time. We
further speculate that institutional trading overall is more likely to represent a
significant percentage of the trading in a company's shares during the class
action interval in a securities fraud settlement. If this so, why then do we see
that in a significant portion of the reported decisions appointing a lead
plaintiff, there is not any financial institution seeking to represent the class?
And, in the few instances where a group of individuals was preferred over a
petitioning financial institution, why were they preferred? Why were there
not other financial institutions who sought to be appointed that had larger
losses, larger than both those of the institution that did petition and also those
28. See, e.g., In re Raxorfish, Inc. Sec. Litig., 143 F. Supp.2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (describing
the contest among law firms who competed to be counsel for a securities class action by advancing
their respective candidates to be the lead plaintiff. The court concluded that "the instant case illustrates
... securities class litigation continues to be lawyer-driven in material respects and the reforms
Congress contemplated in the Reform Act can be achieved, if at all, only with some help from the
courts"). Id. at 307.
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of the group of individuals ultimately appointed lead counsel?
In section IV, we further address these concerns indirectly, by examining
another phenomenon: whether institutions not only fail to step up to be a lead
plaintiff, but whether they also fail to submit claims to the settlement
administrator who is dispensing funds from settled securities class actions.
However, we first need to make clear the institutional investors' obligations,
or lack thereof, to file suit or make claims in these cases.
II. THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR AS A FIDUCIARY
What are the legal compulsions for the institutional investor to petition to
be a lead plaintiff? To file a claim in a settled case? Should the institutional
investor on both counts just stay in bed? When the institutional investor, such
as an investment bank, acts for its own account, it has no obligation except
the general social obligation to take care of itself without being a burden to
others. Thus, it might refuse to hamess its self-interest to the prosecution of
the securities class action. And should it choose not to file a claim when the
case is settled, its slovenly action is celebrated by other class members
because there is more money to distribute to them. However, typically
institutional investors are acting as representatives for others. As such, they
are easily classified as fiduciaries. The source of this obligation varies from
institution to institution, but as will be seen, their obligation to file claims in
settled securities class actions appears not to vary. This fiduciary command,
however, falls on the fund's managers, not on the institution itself.2 9
A. PrivatePensionFunds
Since 1974, the fount of private pension funds managers' fiduciary
obligations has been the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), which, among other features, sets forth certain fiduciary
obligations. 30 The fiduciary obligation provisions of ERISA are a central
aspect of its protections of employee benefit rights.31 The exact boundaries of
ERISA's fiduciary requirements are decided within its broad command in

29. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 6, at 2112 ("It is the managers of the institutional
investors, not the institutions themselves, that are fiduciaries."). On the general topic of the fiduciary
responsibilities of the institution as a lead plaintiff, see Craig C. Martin & Mathew H. Metcalf, The
FiduciaryDuties of InstitutionalInvestors in Securities Litigation, 56 Bus. LAW. 1381 (2001).
30. See29U.S.C.§§ 1001-1144 (2001).
31. See generally Deborah A. Geier, ERISA: Punitive Damagesfor Breach of FiduciaryDuty, 35
CASE W. RES. 743, 746 (1985). The Act's duties extend not only to one who exercises control over the
fund, but also to those who render advice. Id. at 747-48.

HeinOnline -- 80 Wash. U. L. Q. 860 2002

2002]

LEAVING MONEY ON THE TABLE

section 404 that imposes on managers a duty to use the degree of skill, care,
and prudence of a reasonable person "in a like capacity and familiar with
such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and
with like aims. 32 Though this standard has a similar ring to that found in
everyday tort law decisions, it is generally understood that ERISA is even
more exacting in its demands than what prevails at common law. 33 ERISA
also imposes an affirmative obligation of loyalty on fund managers by its
requirement that these plan fiduciaries must discharge 34their duties solely in
the interests of the fund's participants and beneficiaries.
The fiduciary duty embodied in ERISA can be traced to the common law
of trusts and therefore embodies the obligation to preserve and maintain fund
assets. It is on this foundation that Professors Weiss and Beckerman
extrapolate an obligation for fund managers to consider initiating suit where
necessary to protect, maintain, or reclaim fund property that is the subject of
their trust. 36 Pursuit, however, is not mandated if the manager's decision not
to act is reasonably based. Thus, in McMahon v. McDowell, the court held an
ERISA fiduciary did not breach its duty to the fund by failing to take steps to
enforce a claim, and could even abandon 37the claim, if the fiduciary
reasonably believed that action would be futile.
This holding has significant implications for our interpretation of
PSLRA's provisions. Because the PSLRA bars discovery prior to the court's
consideration of the defendants' motion to dismiss, the information bearing
on the suit's merits that is available even to the most sophisticated investor is
extremely limited.38 Hence, to the extent there are nontrivial costs to an
institution from petitioning to become a lead plaintiff, not to mention the
uncertainty of whether the institution will be selected, these costs may weigh
more heavily than the expected benefits to the institution from the suit, not to
mention its participation in the suit. Thus, though the private pension fund's
managers may theoretically face liability for imprudently assessing whether
to serve as a lead plaintiff for a securities class action claim, there would be

32. 29 U.S.C. § 1104.
33. See, e.g., Susan J. Stabile, Pension Plan Investments in Employer Securities: More Is Not
Always Better, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 61, 71 (1998).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 1104. The force of each of these duties is underscored by ERISA's provision that
damages or equitable relief can be sought against any fiduciary who breaches his or her duties under
the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
35. See, e.g., Central States Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Trans., Inc., 472
U.S. 559 (1985).
36. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 6, at 2116.
37. 794 F.2d 100, 110 (3d Cir. 1986).
38. Randall S.Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Using State Inspection Statutes for Discovery in
FederalSecurities FraudAction, 77 B.U. L. REv. 69, 71 (1997).

HeinOnline -- 80 Wash. U. L. Q. 861 2002

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL. 80:855

many potential justifications for them to assume a posture of rational apathy.
However, with respect to failing to submit a claim to an administrator in a
settled action for proven losses, we think there would be far fewer instances
in which apathy would be a reasonable response to its fiduciary
39
obligations.
B. PublicPension Funds
Though nonfederal public pension funds are specifically exempted from
ERISA,4 ° the fiduciary obligations that apply to public pension fund
managers are no less demanding than the ERISA standards for our purposes.
State pension funds are governed by the general state laws pertaining to trusts
and investments. In addition, there are special pension fund legislative
requirements at the state, county, and even municipal levels. 4' For example,
Califomia sets forth fiduciary obligations for its retirement pension fund in
its Constitution, embracing a standard very similar to that found in ERISA.42
By contrast, New York does not have either a constitutional or statutory
standard, but because such managers are deemed trustees, they are subject to
43
the common law fiduciary standard that applies to trustees generally.
Furthermore, a detailed list of similar fiduciary principles is set forth in the
Uniform Management of Public Employee Retirement Systems Act that has
now been adopted in sixteen states." Because of the great similarity in the
39. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 6, at 2117. To be sure, if the expected payment from the
fund was dwarfed by the cost to prepare and submit the claim, the fiduciary, consistent with its
fiduciary obligations, could choose not to submit the claim. Beyond this limited instance, it would be
difficult to envision bases that would be consistent with the fiduciary being rationally apathetic.
40. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (2001).
41. See generally BETTY LINN KRIKORIAN, FIDUCIARY STANDARDS IN PENSION AND TRUST
FUND MANAGEMENT (1989).

42. See CAL. CONST. art. XVI § 17(c) (2001) ("[D]ischarge their duties ...with the care, skill,
prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like
capacity and familiar with these matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character
and with like aims.").
43. See Krikorian, supra note 41, at 346. See also N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW §§ 176-79
(McKinney 2001).
44. A trustee or other fiduciary shall discharge duties with respect to a retirement system:
(1)solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries;
(2) for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries and paying
reasonable expenses of administering the system;
(3) with the care, skill, and caution under the circumstances then prevailing which a prudent
person acting in a like capacity and familiar with those matters would use in the conduct of an
activity of like character and purpose;
(4) impartially, taking into account any differing interests of participants and beneficiaries;
(5) incurring only costs that are appropriate and reasonable; and
(6) in accordance with a good-faith interpretation of the law governing the retirement program and
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functions performed by public pension fund managers and private pension
fund managers, and because of the nearly identical scope of their fiduciary
obligations, there is every reason to expect that the obligations of public
pension fund managers with respect to pursuing a securities claim will be the
same as that for private pension fund managers.4 5
C. Mutual FundManagers
The Investment Company Act of 194046 sought to protect investors in
registered mutual funds by, among other steps, imposing on the fund advisors
and their directors certain fiduciary obligations, as well as by creating a wide
range of prophylactic requirements.4 7 In addition to the fiduciary obligations
imposed by the Investment Company Act, advisors are subject to the
demands of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.48 Furthermore, the
Investment Company Act does not preempt state law fiduciary standards that
apply generally to officers and directors of mutual fund companies, 49 so the
directors and managers of mutual funds have the same fiduciary obligations
to their shareholders as do directors and managers of other corporations.50 Of
special interest here is that the fund's advisor, a vendor of services to the
mutual fund company, is seen as having a fiduciary obligation to the fund
and to the fund's shareholders. 5' In this respect, mutual funds are quite
different from, say, General Motors, whose various suppliers of services and
goods are not deemed to have a fiduciary relationship to General Motors'

system.

The Uniform Management of Public Employee Retirement Systems Act § 7 (1997), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulcframe.htm (visited Feb. 9, 2002). Section 11 of the Act imposes
personal liability upon fiduciaries who breach an obligation under the Act.
45. The Uniform Act's obligations are derived from ERISA and the law of trusts. See Steven L.
Willbom, Public Pensions and the Uniform Management of Public Employee Retirement Systems Act,
51 RUTGERS L. REV. 141, 145 (1998).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l et seq. (2001).
47. Id.

48. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 et seq. (2001).
49. See Green v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 245 F.3d 214, 225-26 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that

Congress did not intend by enacting section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act authorizing suits for
excessive management fees to preempt state law fiduciary principles that apply to the directors'
decision to award excessive compensation).
50. See generally Symposium Panel, Mutual Fund Regulation in the Next Millennium: I. Fund
Governance, 44 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 431 (2001).
51. See TAMAR FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS: THE INVESTMENT
COMPANY ACT AND THE INVESTMENT ADVISORS ACT 343 (2000) (suggesting that an advisor has a
fiduciary relationship that calls for it to act primarily for the benefit of the other in matters connected

to its undertaking). The advisor's duties are determined in this regard by reference to the principles of
common law regarding agents, and, because they are closely analogous to brokers, advisors are subject
to more demanding standards than agents. Id. at 372.
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stockholders.
So understood, the mutual fund's directors, officers, and advisors are all
subject to a fiduciary duty to not act negligently, although negligence in this
context involves some element of intent such that the standard is more akin
to that of recklessness. 52 Nevertheless, the objective standard applied remains
that of the level of skill and prudence that the reasonable
person would
53
institution.
similar
a
for
undertaking
similar
a
in
exercise
D. Insurance Company Managers
Insurance companies are exempt from the Investment Company Act5 4 and
are instead regulated by state insurance codes and commissioners 5 Most
states do not impose a fiduciary obligation on insurance companies to their
policyholders; fiduciary duties do exist on the part of directors and officers to
shareholders for nonmutual insurance companies.5 6 This said, some courts
nevertheless have recognized that some functions are trustee-like and have
imposed fiduciary obligations on the insurance company's management
when performing tasks such as collecting premiums and managing company
funds.57 Under this view, imprudence in pursuing assets that belong to the
insurance company would constitute a breach of fiduciary duties if company
reserves are reduced because of management's lack of prudence.
When the insurance company has stockholders, the fiduciary demands on
its directors and officers should be the same as with any corporation.
Subsumed within the corporate directors' and officers' fiduciary obligations
is the duty to be attentive to acts or practices that will harm the corporation. 8

52. Id. at 645-46.
53. Id. at 657-58.
54. See Section 3(c)(3), 15 U.S. C. § 80a-3(c)(3) (2001).
55. This arrangement reflects the impact of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 10111015 (2001), which exempts insurance companies from most federal regulatory provisions, except the
antitrust laws.
56. See Theodore Allegaert, Comment, DerivativeActions by Policyholders on Behalf of Mutual
Insurance Companies, 63 U. Cn. L. REV. 1063, 1071 (1996).
The relationship between mutual insurance policyholders and their company derives historically
from statutes under which mutual companies are chartered and from the contractual terms of
issued policies. Incident to membership in a mutual company, the policyholder acquires certain
proprietary interests, yet these interests are not fiduciary and certainly are not akin to partnership.
In addition, membership places the policyholders in a creditor-like contractual relationship with
the company.
Id.
57. See generally id. at 1072.
58. Consider here the observation of In re Caremark Intl, Inc., Derivative Litigation by
Chancellor William Allen:
[A] director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporation
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To this end, there is a well-recognized obligation for boards of directors to
assure compliance systems and standard operating procedures that are
reasonable given the nature of the firm's activities.5 9 This obligation is
heightened by the general awareness that class action settlements frequently
yield large awards to financial institutions, such as those described by Weiss
and Beckerman. Thus, it is not a big step to conclude that just as the mutual
funds (and insurance companies) must assure the safety of the securities that
are within the firm's portfolio, they should also assure that appropriate
procedures are in place to claim material amounts that may be due the mutual
fund (or insurance company) in a class action settlement. What is material is
a relative inquiry. In the context of filing a claim with a settlement
administrator for a settled class action, it would seem that materiality is best
assessed in terms of the relationship between the cost of submitting the claim
and the expected payment from the settlement. The costs of filing such
claims appear at first blush to be trivial, and therefore we would expect most
funds that traded during the class period to seek a recovery.
On the other hand, there are many more persuasive reasons that can
support the directors' or officers' decision not to become a lead plaintiff.
There is a question of the resources required to see that task through to the
end. Those without experience in such matters may easily overestimate the
burdens of being a lead plaintiff. Or they may correctly estimate that, given
the firm's limited resources, the expected benefits of such intervention on its
part are on average insufficient reward for the effort entailed. Also, there are
distinct advantages to free-riding on the efforts of others. If there is no reason
to believe that the firm's position will be improved by pursuing recovery as
the lead plaintiff, rational apathy is both efficient and understandable.6 °

information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure
to do so under some circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable for losses
caused by noncompliance with applicable legal standards.
698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). See generally JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 10.4
(2002).
59. See, e.g., In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
60. A less acceptable reason is suggested by WILLIAM M. O'BARR & JOHN M. CONLEY,
FORTUNE AND FOLLY: THE WEALTH AND POWER OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING (1992). Their study of
the culture of selected financial institutions found that, with the exception of public pension funds,
managers were sensitive to the fact that their employer was or could be a vendor of products that the
class action defendant consumes. Hence, a visible participation in the suit would seriously jeopardize
the company's, bank's, or insurer's long-term interests.
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E. Bank Common Trust Funds
Common trust funds operated by banks are exempt from the Investment
Company Act of 1940,61 but their managers are subject to the common law
fiduciary duties of trustees. Though the specifics of a trustee's fiduciary duty
varies from state to state, the American Law Institute's Restatement of Trusts
captures the position adhered to by most of the states:
A fiduciary has a duty to take reasonable steps to realize on claims that
are the property of the trust ... but should do so only when she
believes that the probable benefit to the trust will exceed the costs the
trust reasonably can expect to incur. On the other hand, a fiduciary
cannot properly abandon claims affecting the trust property unless it
reasonably appears that a suit would be futile or the expense of
litigation or
the character of the claim would make it reasonable not to
62
suit.
bring
In short, the obligations of the bank trustee are no different from those we
have seen apply to other fiduciaries.
F. Synthesis: InstitutionsAre Normally Obligatedto File Claims in
Securities Settlements, But May Rationally Choose Not to Be Lead
Plaintiffs
63
Felix Frankfurter's famous observation regarding fiduciaries
underscores the opacity that surrounds the meaning and, more particularly,
the demands of being a fiduciary. Whatever the vagueness of fiduciary
obligations in other contexts, in the context of the institutional investor's
obligations to its investors, beneficiaries, policyholders, etc., there is amazing
uniformity. Though such institutions cannot abandon without reason a claim
against a third party, financial institutions are not under an affirmative
obligation to pursue inchoate claims. The speculative nature of the claim,
coupled with the uncertainty that the institution's decision to serve as a lead
plaintiff will make a difference, makes apathy the reasonable and rational

61. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(3) (2001).
62. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 6, at 2113 (citing Restatement of Trusts, Second, § 177,
192).
63. See Sec. Exch. Comm'n v. Chencry Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
[T]o say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To
whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he
failed to discharge these obligations? And what are the consequences of his deviation from duty?
Id. at 85-86.
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course much of the time.
But when the claim is no longer inchoate, so that money is to be received
by submitting proof of the institution's trading during the fraud interval, the
justifiable bounds of rational apathy are seriously constricted. The benefits of
filing and perfecting these claims are much more concrete, especially when
the fund managers are gauging their performances in comparison to market
benchmarks. What is then a reasonable course of action should be guided
again by comparing the costs to submit the claim with the expected award
from the settlement, but we expect this to be a one-sided calculation in favor
of filing for any actively trading institution.
III. PUTTING THE ODOR OF MONEY IN THE AIR: THE PROCEDURAL
ASPECTS OF NOTIFYING CLAIMANTS

Settlements of securities class actions require the approval of the court.
The truly final disposition of the case occurs when the settlement
administrator, who is either appointed by the court or simply selected by the
suit's attorneys, submits its report of how the settlement was distributed. The
settlement administrator eams its fees not by simply writing checks, but also
by its extensive efforts to assure that all reasonable efforts have been taken to
give potential claimants notice of the settlement and how those investors can
submit their claims so as to be eligible to participate in a settlement.
Professional settlement administrators for class actions always face a
challenging task in distributing settlement funds to those entitled to be
members of the class. In securities class actions, not only is there the serious
administrative task of assuring that those filing claims are entitled to
participate in the settlement, 64 but imparting notice of the settlement to class
notice to potential class claimants is
members is also difficult. Giving
65
complicated by several factors.
The first step customarily followed by the settlement administrator is
obtaining from the transfer agent for the security's issuer the list of registered
stockholders. However, if the issuer is bankrupt or otherwise not in existence

64. This task is further complicated when the terms of the settlement provide for differing
recoveries within the class action period based upon when a particular claimant's securities transaction
occurred.
65. The following description of the steps settlement administrators pursue is based on numerous
conversations the authors have had with several administrators. See also Aft. Biran Burke, In re Health
Mgmt. Systems Sec. Litig. (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Aff. Ellen Riley, In re Physicians Computer Network,
Inc. Sec. Litig. (D.N.J. 2000); Aff. Shandarese Garr, in In re Engelhard Sec. Litig. (D.N.J. 2000); Aff.
Ellen Riley, Alpern v. Utilicorp United, Inc. (W.D. Mo. 2000); Aft. G. Peter Buchband, Wright v. BT
Office Products Int'l, Inc. (S.D.N.Y 1999); Aff. G. Peter Buchband, State of Wis. Board v. Goldfield
(D.N. Tex. 1999).
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at the time of the settlement, the transfer agent generally possesses no reliable
records. In any case, settlement administrators do not rely solely on the
transfer agent's records when such records are available. Because most
investors hold their securities in street names, the list of registered holders
from the transfer agent will report a significant number of holders as CEDE
& Co., the depository for most brokers. The settlement administrator
maintains in its database a list of over 2000 brokers that participate in the
Depository Trust Company (the so-called DTC Participant List).6 Using the
DTC Participant List, the settlement administrator forwards to each such
broker a notice of settlement, generally with a special notice asking that the
broker assist in informing its customers who possibly are included in the
settlement. The brokers respond by identifying the addresses of their
customers whose trading occurred during the class action period. They then
either provide a printed or electronic version of the customers' addresses or
forward labels with the customers' addresses. Some brokers prefer to
circulate the claims notices directly to their customers and, therefore, obtain
from the settlement administrator an ample supply of settlement notices that
the broker can then forward directly to the appropriate customers.
Institutional investors who prefer anonymity may not be totally visible to the
settlement administrator during this stage of the administrator's work. For
example, an institution that depends upon an advisor or advisors to file the
required Form 13F may not be directly identified to the settlement
administrator so that the notice of settlement is directed to the advisor and not
to the institution itself. When this occurs, the ball is in such advisor's court.
Just as for the broker whose customer holdings are recorded in street name,
the advisor has an obligation to forward the settlement notice to the
institution. Thus, the notices of settlement that are circulated customarily
request that the notice be directed to the securities' beneficial owners, if other
than the advisor. 67 A further step of circulating notice is the publication of the
settlement notice in the national media, such as The Wall Street Journal,
FinancialTimes, USA Today, or Investors Business Daily.
The reader should be impressed with the steps taken by settlement
administrators to assure that those investors with claims learn of them and
submit proof of their claim to the administrator. Assurance that their steps are
reasonable occurs at several levels. First, all aspects of the settlement are

66. This list is updated annually by the Depository Trust Company (DTC).
67. Note that the settlement administrator does not know ex ante that the advisor's listed
holdings are held solely as an agent for another, although there is more than ample reason to expect
this is true a significant percentage of the time. Thus, the settlement administrator's request that the
settlement notice should be forwarded is couched in less than mandatory language.
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subject to the court's watchful eye. Though some judicial eyes are sharper
than others, the settlement administrators have learned to apply the highest
standards consistently across all settlements. Courts customarily ask the
administrator to set forth in writing all of the steps they have taken to assure
that potential claimants are duly informed. Second, the steps followed by
settlement administrators parallel in many respects those required by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in an analogous area, the
distribution of proxy materials, annual reports, and other company notices to
investors.
The SEC has long toiled in meeting the challenge of assuring that
company communications-particularly proxy statements---could reach the
company's beneficial owners.68 With 70% and 80% of all outstanding shares
held in street name, 69 the SEC's task is a formidable one. To assure that
corporate releases reach those who have an economic stake in the company,
the SEC rules impose a series of responsibilities upon banks and brokers who
hold shares as nominees for the beneficial owners. 70 The baseline
requirement is that companies registered under either the Securities
Exchange Act or the Investment Company Act of 1940 must, at least twenty
days before the record date for a meeting, employ a search-card procedure
whereby they ask the nominee (broker, bank, or other party) to tell them the
number of copies of the company proxy materials they need in order to send
them to all of the beneficial owners the nominee represents. 71 Nominees are
also required to identify the number of shares owned by each beneficial
68. For a complete analysis of the history and details of the SEC's regulation in this area, see
RANDALL S. THOMAS & CATHERINE T. DIXON, ARANOW & EINHORN ON PROXY CONTESTS FOR

CORPORATE CONTROL (3d ed. 1999).
69.

See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 34-38406 (Mar. 14, 1997), 62 Fed. Reg. 13,922 (Mar.

24, 1997). Legal title is customarily recorded in the name of CEDE & Co., the nominee of Depository
Trust Company, an entity that owes much of its existence to the efficiency of not depending upon
individual owners to physically delivery share certificates to an intermediary each time the securities
are sold.
70. As originally enacted, section 14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act conferred upon the SEC

very general rule-making authority regarding the obligations of broker-dealers with respect to proxy
solicitations of their customers' shares in companies listed on a national securities exchange. A 1964
amendment not only expanded the scope of the SEC's authority to over-the-counter securities but
clarified that its authority included "requiring ... broker-dealers to transmit proxy solicitation
materials to their customers .... " See Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
The final expansion occurred in 1985 when its authority was extended to banks. See Pub. L. No. 99222, 99 Stat. 1737 (1985).
71. Exchange Act Rule 14a-13(a), 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-13(a) (2001). Banks frequently are

themselves but nominees of other banks who are nominees of another bank or the beneficial owner.
This results in a "piggyback" system whereby each bank nominee has one day to respond by
identifying their respondent bank. Id.
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72

Direct mailings of routine annual reports by the company to many
beneficial owners are also possible if the company has compiled lists of
nonobjecting beneficial owners.7 3
Thereafter, the issuer may mail its materials directly to any nonobjecting
stockholders and provide the nominee with a sufficient number of the
materials to be forwarded to the objecting owners.'74 Alternatively, the issuer
may provide the nominee with enough sets of the materials for all the owners
it represents, whether they are objecting or non-objecting holders.75 As part
of this process, the SEC has imposed an affirmative obligation upon the
brokers and banks that serve as nominees to forward to these beneficial
owners the proxy statements and other information given to them by the
issuer, and to respond to requests by the issuer to provide a list of the
nonobjecting beneficial owners.76
There is no statutory mandate for the settlement of class actions
equivalent to the mandate in Section 14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
with respect to the circulation of a notice of settlement. Nevertheless, the
fiduciary relationship between customers, whether widowers or large
financial institutions, and their broker-advisors embodies an affirmative
command that the notices be forwarded to the beneficial owners. Moreover,
settlement administrators pursue additional steps to assure that all possible
participants in a settlement receive notice of a claim, not the least of which is
publishing notice of a settlement in the national press. To be sure, advisors
might not forward the notice, and beneficial owners may turn a blind eye to
the reality that securities class actions are prevalent and that significant funds
are regularly distributed to institutional claimants in such settlements.
IV. DO INSTITUTIONS FILE CLAIMS IN SECURITIES FRAUD SETTLEMENTS?

In recent months, there have been allegations raised in the popular press
and elsewhere that institutional shareholders are giving up "hundreds of
millions of dollars in class action settlements for which they are eligible
simply by neglecting to file claims. ' 77 These claims, however, are based

72. Id.
73. Exchange Act Rules 14b-1, 17 C.F.R. 240.14b-1 (2001), and 14b-2, C.F.R. 240.14b-2
(2001), govern this process.
74. Exchange Act Rule 14a-13(b), 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-13(b) (2001).

75. Id.
76. Exchange Act Rule 14b-1, 17 C.F.R. 240.14b-1 (2001) (broker-dealers) and Rule 14b-2, 17

C.F.R. 240.14b-2 (2001) (banks).
77. See, e.g., Christiane Bird, Pension FundsMiss Out on Much Cash by Failingto File in Class-
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largely on "informal and anecdotal evidence," although there has been at
least one attempt by the National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers
of institutions. 7 8
and Treasurers to collect survey data from a broad sample
This survey showed that about one-third of the thirty-three respondent
institutions had made no recovery of any asset losses in the prior five years, a
time period in which more than 700 securities class action cases were
settled.7 9 Given the enormous share of the stock market that is held by
institutional shareholders (25% for public pension funds and another 35% by
corporate funds) and the tremendous amount of money available in these
settlements (estimated at $8.39 billion over the past three years), a logical
inference from these responses is that it is "highly unlikely any significant
public fund invested in the market could possibly have been ineligible to
' ° In other
participate in class action recoveries through this 5-year span.
words, it appears, based on the limited evidence compiled to date, that some
institutional investors are not filing claims in securities fraud class action
settlements and are therefore leaving potentially large sums of money on the
table.
In this section, we explain our efforts to develop a data set that can be
used to test these claims. First, we explain how we collected our data and
some of the strengths and limitations of the sources that we have used. Then,
we give some very preliminary results based on the small number of
settlements that we have been able to obtain sufficient information about to
date.
A. The Data
In order to get a better sense of how many institutions are both eligible to
make claims and actually do perfect such claims in these settlements, we
needed to first generate a sample of securities fraud settlements. We enlisted
the aid of three settlement administrators to help us identify a group of
securities fraud class action settlements and asked them to send us the
settlement notices from these cases. We used these notices to gather a wide
variety of information about these cases, including the identity of the lead
plaintiff for post-PSLRA cases, and the class period for each case.
We then set about generating two additional types of data. First, for each

Action Cases, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2001, at A0.
78. Id.
79. ALAN P. CLEVELAND, CLASS ACTION CLAIM MANAGEMENT: A FIDUCIARY MANDATE

(2001) (mimeo on file with author).
80. Id.
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settlement for which we received a settlement notice, we considered the
company settling the case as a potential member of our sample. For each
sample company, we needed to determine which institutions held stock in the
company at the beginning of the class period, and which institutions traded in
the company's stock over the fraud interval. To do this, we used data taken
from Form 13Fs filed by institutional investors. In particular, we used the
Spectrum 3 database, which lists each company for which institutional
investors have reported stock ownership, the names of those institutional
investors that reported holding the company's stock, the size of the
institutions' share holdings in each quarter, and the changes in these
institutions' share holdings on a quarterly basis during the class interval. For
those sample companies that were listed in Spectrum 3, we extracted this
information and used it to create a spreadsheet that reflected all of the
institutions reporting trades-and the size of those trades-in the sample
company during the class period.8
The reporting institutions for Form 13F include a very broad group of
organizations. The list not only includes the types of financial institutions
whose general fiduciary obligations were earlier examined in Part II-private
and public pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, and bank
common funds-but also hedge funds, foundations, endowments, and even
partnerships. This means that our sample includes a wide range of different
types of institutional investors, allowing us to determine if different groups of
these investors vary in the frequency with which they file claims in these
cases.
We realize that our reliance on data reported in Form 13Fs as our source
of information about institutional shareholders' stock ownership and trading
is subject to several criticisms, including that institutions often delay
reporting changes in their holdings on a timely basis, and that they may not
report all changes in their stock holdings. Equally limiting is that the Form
13F is frequently filed by an advisor to the financial institution under the
advisor's name and not under the name of the institution.82 These problems
may in part be a result of the SEC's failure to review these filings and the
lack of financial or other penalties for late or inaccurate institutional filings.
However, in the end, this is the only publicly available data source on
institutional shareholder stock ownership in individual companies. The only
alternative way of generating the data that we need on holdings and changes
in holdings is to ask those institutions that held shares in the sample
81. Some companies were not listed in Spectrum 3, and are therefore not included in our sample.
82. Moreover, advisors can, and frequently do, serve more than one institution and as a matter of
expediency aggregate their holdings for all advisees when reporting on Form 13F.
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companies to provide us with this information directly, if they still have it.
While we may choose to pursue this avenue farther down the road, at the
moment we must be content with using the Spectrum 3 data to determine
whether institutional investors have potential claims that they should file in
these settlements.
After we generated a list of the institutional investors that held stock in
the sample companies and traded in the stock during the class interval, we
examined our data to see if these institutions filed claims in the securities
class action settlements. We asked the three settlement administrators that
had provided us with the notices of settlements if they would be willing to
help us determine if the institutions that we had identified as potential
claimants actually filed claims in the settlements that they administered. We
provided them with our spreadsheets listing the institutions that we had
identified as trading stock in the sample companies during the class period
and asked them to compare our list with the list of claimants in their
databases so that we could determine how well the two data sets matched one
another.
One problem with this methodology is that some institutional investors
use third-party advisors as money managers to manage some or all of their
portfolio. In these circumstances, the third-party advisors will often be
responsible for filing claims in securities fraud settlements. If the third-party
advisor files the claim in its own name-not in the institutional investor's
name-then we also need to determine the name of the beneficial owner of
the securities so that we can get the information that we need. For that
reason, we asked the three settlement administrators to search their databases
not only for those claims filed by institutional investors in their own names,
but also for third-party advisor claims that identified the institutional
investors as the beneficial owners. We were informed that they would
provide us with lists designating such beneficial owners.
One of the settlement administrators, who we will call Admin One, made
the comparisons that we asked for for a group of forty-one sample companies
and sent us a spreadsheet listing all of the institutional shareholders that we
had identified; whether they had made a claim or not; the size of the claim
that they made, if any; and the amount of their recovery. Admin One advised
us that they believed that they were able to accurately determine roughly
85% to 90% of the time whether the institutions that we had identified as
potential claimants had made claims or not. They reported that they believed,
based on their prior experience in administering settlements, that the thirdparty advisors probably omitted to provide complete information about the
beneficial ownership of some subset of the remaining 10% to 15% of the
institutions we identified. Thus, for the sample of companies that we
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obtained from Admin One, we recognize that our data probably contain a
reasonable number of omitted claims. We cannot correct the data for this
problem without additional information from the institutional investors
themselves.
The other two settlement administrators, Admin Two and Admin Three,
gave us different sets of information. Admin Two provided us with two sets
of data about eleven sample companies: the first was a summary list of all
claimants, including the size of their losses and amounts of their awards; the
second was a more detailed listing of the particulars of each claimant's
trading in the sample company's securities during the class period. Using this
information, we were able to pull out a list of institutional investors making
claims and the size of their claims that we compared to our data on the
institutional investors that were eligible to make claims in these cases. As
with the data provided by Admin One, there are undoubtedly some claims
misidentified as being made by third-party advisors, which should be
classified as being made by institutions. We anticipate this error to affect our
sample data for the same reasons given by Admin One. We note that we
were unable to identify as many of the beneficial owners for claims filed by
banks acting as custodians in the Admin Two data set because of the way the
data were given to us. This will have the effect of decreasing the number of
(usually small) claimants that we can identify because their claims are filed
by the banks that are the custodians for their shares. 83
Admin Three provided us only with a list of the largest 100 actual
claimants for a sample of ten companies. We should be able to compare this
list with the data that we had assembled on institutional investor holdings.
However, we cannot determine for those institutions whose names do not
appear on the list of the largest claimants if they actually filed claims. At the
time of this writing, Admin Three has not provided us with any further data
in this regard to this point. As a result, we decided to wait until we received
more information from Admin Three before continuing to work with their
data.
B. PreliminaryAnalysis
From the data provided by Admin One and Admin Two, we were able to
perform some preliminary statistical analysis. Despite the differences in the
83. To make the data more comparable between the Admin One and Admin Two data sets, we
will need to aggregate all of the beneficial owners claiming through banks in the Admin One data set.
Although this will reduce the number of identified claimants, it will result in creating comparable
numbers of institutional investor claims.
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two data sets, we extracted similar sets of results from them. For both
samples, all of the settlements involved purchaser classes. We were able to
determine the number of Form 13F filers that had reported purchases during
the sample period and to compare that list with the names of the beneficial
owners that were filing claims in the settlements. Thus, we are able to
calculate the percentage of Form 13F traders that file claims in each
settlement. Table 2 sets forth this information by sample company, as well as
data on the average size of the claim for each institution that filed a claim.
We note that we have incomplete information on several of the companies
(indicated by dashes and not included in the totals for any of the columns).
Table 2
ADMIN ONE DATA ON SETTLEMENTS; 13F DATA ON FILING

Sample
Company

Number
Filing

Number
Trading

Percentage
Filing

Av. Loss
(dollars)

4
121
3
2
1
71
0
4

22
265
29
76
41
312
13
47

18.18%
45.66%
10.34%
2.63%
2.44%
22.76%
0%
8.51%

29,813
19,640
102,466
13,998
55,975
26,317

9
11

73
83

12.33%
13.25%

328,006
54,152

25
12
7

76
108
22

32.89%
11.11%
31.82%

215,947
10,178
166,915

2
2

35
12

5.71%
16.67%

270,811
39,522

20

54

37.04%

137,309

Number

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

8,049

9

10
11

7

12

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23
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Sample
Company
Number
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
Total/Averages

Number
Filing
221
601
180
5
0
31
0
1
39
0
1
15

Number
Trading
820
1,345
452
19
6
145
8
47
180
18
13
54

[VOL. 80:855

Percentage
Filing

Av. Loss
(dollars)

26.95%
44.68%
39.82%
26.32%

45,912
2,551
5,983
17,467

21.38%

38,450

2.13%
21.67%

26,371
218,139

7.69%
27.78%

775,395
2,228

_

4
0
12
385
2
0

49
4
37
961
34
4

1,791

5,464

8.16%

31,915

32.43%
40.06%
5.89%

133,270
5,803
91,463

32.78%

102,644

The Admin Two data gave us a slightly different look at the settlement
process. They provided us disaggregated data on all of the claims made in
each of the settlements, although they did not match our list of Form 13F
filers with their database for us. While there remains much analysis to be
done on the information they provided us, at this point we choose to generate
results that are comparable in nature to those shown above. In Table 3, we
present the same percentage of Form 13F traders that filed claims in each
settlement, as well as data on the average size of the claim made by each
institution.
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Table 3
ADMIN Two DATA ON SETTLEMENTS;

13F DATA ON FILING

Percentage
Filing

Average
Loss (dollars)

Recovery
Percentage

7
60
27
8
1
51
55
25
50
90
144

28.6%
18.5%
29.6%
25.0%
0%
15.7%
25.5%
28.0%
26.0%
18.89%
25.69%

263,050
705,275
356,448
127,500
150,507
48,227
322,971
657,216
1,919,254
60,289

18.89%
48.79%
5.25%
49.26%
N/A
12.12%
23.91%
N/A
5.84%
N/A
100.23%

Total/
517
119
Averages
* Excluding Case 5.
**Excluding Cases 5, 8 and 10.

23.01%

461,074*

33.04%**

Sample
Company
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Number Number
Filing Trading
2
11
8
2
0
8
14
7
13
17
37

_

Average
Award
(dollars)
46,690
344,104
18,714
62,807
18,241
11,531
N/A
38,281
N/A
60,428

75,112**

The most obvious result that can be seen in Tables 2 and 3 is the low
percentage of Form 13F traders that appear to file claims in these settlements.
Looking at the last row of each table, we have calculated the averages across
all of the settlements in the two samples to give the reader a flavor of the
data. Looking across this row in Table 2, we find an average filing
percentage for eligible claims of 32.78%, whereas in Table 3, the average
percentage of Form 13F filers perfecting their claims is 23.0 1%.84 If all those
institutions filing Form 13Fs indicating trades during the class period were
also filing and perfecting claims in these settlements, we would see 100%
averages here.
Average loss is substantial in both samples. For Table 2, the average loss
is $102,644; in Table 3, the average loss is $461,074. Although there are
some large variations across the different settlements, the magnitude of these
averages would seem to indicate that many institutions have suffered
significant losses in these cases. Of course, what determines the value of
filing a claim is not the loss suffered, but the recovery expected. Here, our

84. Note that this is the percentage of filers whose claims are filed and accepted as valid by the
settlement administrators. At present, we are not calculating the percentage of 13F filers who file
claims that are disallowed. Based on our review of the data, adding these ineligible claimants would
slightly increase the number of filers in some settlements.

HeinOnline -- 80 Wash. U. L. Q. 877 2002

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL. 80:855

data is less complete, as we are only able to calculate average awards for the
settlements in Table 3. With due regard for the small number of settlements
in this group, we can see that average recovery rates are about one-third of
losses, resulting in an average award for those eight companies of $75,112.
To our eyes, this would seem to be a significant return on the small costs (in
terms of time and money) of filing a claim in a securities fraud class action
settlement.
One implication of the recovery percentages in the Admin Two data set
should also be pointed out. As these percentages are for the most part below
100%, increasing the number of claims filed by institutional investors will
result in lower average recoveries for all of these investors. This will have the
effect of reducing the monetary incentives for these shareholders to file
claims, although we cannot be sure by how much.
We repeat again that caution must be exercised in interpreting these
numbers. While we are sure that there is some under-reporting of claimants
due to problems in determining with complete accuracy the identities of the
institutions filing claims in the settlements, we believe, based on our
conversations with the settlement administrators, that their process accurately
identifies a high percentage of the beneficial owners that file in these
settlements. In addition, the Form 13F data itself may be inaccurate, although
we note in this regard that institutions that fail to file Form 13Fs are not
included in our sample. In fact, we only include those institutions that report
their purchases during the class period, which should understate the number
of institutions that could file claims in the settlements because it excludes
institutions that traded during the class interval but failed to timely report
these trades on their Form 13Fs. Thus, we believe that we have been
conservative in selecting the trading institutions that we are seeking to match
up with the filing institutions in the settlements. Of course, we would prefer
to correct for these problems before concluding that our results will hold up,
but at this point, we do not see how we can make these corrections without
getting information from the institutions themselves, assuming that the
information still exists and that the institutions would be willing to share it.
V. WHY AREN'T INSTITUTIONS FILING?: A RESEARCH AGENDA

We have attempted to answer the question of whether institutional
investors are leaving money on the table by failing to file claims in securities
fraud class actions. We think that their fiduciary duties to file such claims are
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clearly established by existing law 85 and that the costs of filing such claims
are likely to be trivial. Thus, even if the benefits from filing are small,
institutional investors should be filing claims in these settlements.
We conclude that it appears that many of these investors are failing to file
such claims. Despite all of the flaws in our data, the percentage of
institutional investors that we can identify that are actually filing such claims
is well below the number that should be filing these claims. At the same time,
the average recoveries in these settlements seem well in excess of what
would cover the costs of making such claims. While we are well aware that
there are those in the field that believe otherwise-and we stand ready to be
convinced by further evidence-we think that we have offered the most
complete picture of the problem to date.86
What we lack most at the moment is a convincing explanation of why
these institutions are not filing claims in all securities fraud class action
settlements. Two potential explanations have been offered: first, that there
are potential misunderstandings by institutions of the amount that they can
recover in these cases; 87 and second, that these shareholders do not
88
understand that filing claims is part of their legal duty to their beneficiaries.
Based on comments that we have received from attorneys that practice in
the area, and based on our own research, we think that there are several more
plausible hypotheses that should be explored. One strong candidate as an
explanation is that institutions are rational economic beings that make costbenefit calculations concerning whether or not to file claims in these
settlements. They may expect to receive small recoveries in these cases, even
if their losses are large, because some settlements pay out only pennies on the
dollar. Or the recovery amounts may seem large to outsiders but may be very
small in relationship to the size of the institutions' portfolios and therefore
have no material impact on their returns. We think that this is an important
avenue for further research that we intend to pursue. In particular, we need to
inquire further into the underlying claims for the different institutions to look
at the distribution of claims, and we need to ask such questions as whether

85. It bears repeating that the Form 13F filers are a diverse lot. They are not restricted to large
public pension funds that are often discussed when considering shareholder activism, nor even to
institutions that have fiduciary obligations to a set of beneficial owners. We hope to refine our results
to try to sort out the different types of institutions into different categories as we work further with the
data that we have and hope to get in the future.
86. We note that our results are consistent with those in the only other systematic attempt to
address this issue of which we are aware. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 79.
87. Douglas McKeige, Leaving Money on the Table: Are You Collecting on Your Claims?, 3
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ADVOCATE 1 (2001).

88. Cleveland, supra note 79.
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the average figures reported in Tables 2 and 3 conceal a large number of
small claimants for whom filing will result in small gains. We also need to
look at the average recoveries for those institutions that did not file claims in
order to calculate what they would have recovered if they had filed.
Furthermore, we intend to get a better handle on the costs of filing claims and
whether these costs vary significantly over different investors with different
trading volumes and patterns. We also intend to consider the level of detail
that is required for perfecting the claims. More generally, we intend to
examine the effect of the size of the settlement, the size of the individual
institution's potential recovery, the size of the institution's stake in the
company being sued in the case, the size of the case (including how well
publicized the settlement is), and the length of time between the settlement
and the time that the claims arose. All of these are important factors in
determining filing rates for institutional investors.
A second potentially important explanation for the institutions' failure to
file claims is that they do not have personnel that are assigned to handle these
claims. In other words, if the notice of settlement comes in, who does it get
routed to? If it goes to the trading desk, the traders may believe that their job
is to make money for the firm through the purchase and sale of securities, not
by filing claims. Thus, they may do nothing with the claim. Similarly, if the
institutional investor is delegating the responsibility for filing claims to the
custodian of their securities, typically a bank or broker, the custodian may
fail to understand what it needs to do in order to file and perfect a claim.
Many potential pitfalls of this nature may exist at different institutions and
play a major role in explaining their failures to file.
A third possible reason for institutions' failure to file claims may be that
they never receive the notices of settlement. Most institutions hold their stock
in street name, with the beneficial owners holding legal title through a
depository trust. 89 When a company settles a securities fraud case, the notice
of settlement must filter its way through the chain from the depository trust,
to the broker or bank holding the shares in the institution's name, all the way
down to the institutional investor. There is no legal obligation imposed on the
banks or brokers to insure that these notices arrive at the door of the
institutional investors. 90 So we cannot be sure that institutions are even aware
of the settlements when they arise.

89. Thomas & Dixon, supra note 68.
90. If it turns out that many notices are not being received by the institutions, then it may be
necessary for the SEC to consider implementing rules that require banks and brokers to forward these
notices to all the beneficial holders whose shares that they hold. New rules analogous to those adopted
for shareholder voting would seem to be in order. See Thomas & Dixon, supra note 68.
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These potential explanations for institutional investors' failure to file
calaims in securities fraud class action settlements may also be
complementary. In other words, some institutions may decide not to file
because the returns are too small, others may not file because they are not
receiving notice of the settlements, and a third group may not have personnel
assigned to process claims.
The policy implications of our results depend importantly on which
hypotheses are correct and if so, what the costs and benefits are of addressing
them. For example, it might be relatively cheap for the SEC to draft rules to
address widespread failures in the system that notify institutions of class
action settlements. It would be more costly to require institutions to assign
personnel to process claims in these settlements. Finally, it may or may not
be even more expensive to create a legal duty to file claims even where the
dollar amounts of the claims are low. We look forward to addressing these
issues more fully in later research.
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